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which one can view Poland as some kind of 'model' and draw lessons from its experience. In this paper, when I discuss whether or not Poland provides us with a 'model' for democratic transition and European integration, I am considering this question in both the analytical sense -to draw broader comparative and theoretical lessons and conclusions -and from a more normative perspective: whether it is a positive example to, and possible source of emulation for, others?
Poland's transition to democracy and experience of dealing with the communist past
One way that we might be able to draw some broader normative and analytical lessons from the Polish case, and thus look upon it as a model, is to examine its democratic transition: the way that the country extracted itself from communist rule. 2014 marks the twenty fifth anniversary of the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. In Poland, as in most of the rest of the bloc, this was a negotiated process of transition exemplified by the so-called 'round table' negotiations between representatives of the communist regime and democratic opposition, and the peaceful surrender of power by the latter.
3 Many so-called 'comparative transitologists', who are interested in and study processes of democratisation and regime change across the world, posit 'pacting' processes, such as the elite level bargain that occurred during the Polish round table negotiations, as the most normatively desirable model of how such processes of regime-change should proceed. This is because 'pacting' is a process of peaceful, non-violent consensual extraction from a non-democratic regime that provides something for everyone, particularly a 'soft landing' for representatives of the previous regime, giving them a strong stake -and, therefore, incentive not to undermine -the new democratic system. 4 In the Polish case, it can be argued, the elite pacting process ensured that democracy became embedded with no significant actors (including representatives of the former ruling elite) wanting a return to the status quo ante or opposing (broadly speaking) the liberal democratic model. Indeed, for many Poles the elite bargain that facilitated a peaceful transfer of power is the 'foundational myth' of the current, post-communist Polish state; 5 highlighted by the fact that a series of similar round table negotiation processes followed and accompanied the process of regime change in most of the other states of communist Eastern
Europe throughout the rest of 1989. 6 However, there are reasons why we need to be careful about viewing the Polish process of regime change, and particularly the round table negotiations, in this way: as a model of successful democratic transition. One of these reasons is, I would argue, the way that transitional justice and the question of how to deal with legacy of the country's communist past have been recurring issues in post-communist Polish politics. 7 One of the reasons why the 'transitology' literature posits elite-level 'pacting' as a model for 'exiting' the previous non-democratic regime is because it offers something for everyone, specifically it gives the old outgoing elites, a 'stake' in the new democratic system. Poland appeared to very much conform to this principle: the idea of trying to ensure that old elites felt comfortable with the new settlement was very much the approach of the early post-communist governments, exemplified by the so-called 'thick line' policy of the first non-communist prime minister since the country was incorporated into the Soviet bloc at the end of the 1940s, Tadeusz
Mazowiecki. 8 Nonetheless, the fact is that the question of how to deal with the communist past did recur, most strikingly over the issue of so-called lustration, the vetting of individuals for their links with the communist security services, and public access to the extant files of these services.
This culminated in a lustration act and law establishing the Institute of National Remembrance (Instytut Pamięci Narodowej: IPN), a body to oversee and facilitate access to these archives, being passed at the end of the 1990s. However, even then the debate The recurrence of concerns about transitional justice in post-communist Poland suggests that there may be problems with 'forgiving and forgetting' as a model for new democracies in terms of being a means of dealing effectively with the past and old regime elites. It also raises some important questions about the democratisation process and the state of democracy in
Poland. In terms of the latter, transitional justice -and questions of lustration and communist security service file access, specifically -became entwined with other post-communist democratisation discourses on issues such as: the public's right to information about the backgrounds of its representatives, officials and authority figures; and the need to tackle corruption. At the root of this was a wider unease about the perceived failures of the democratisation process in post-communist Poland more generally, with lustration and file access posited as a project designed to implement democratic renewal and enhance and improve the quality of the democracy that was emerging in the country.
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In other words, continued calls for lustration and file access resonated with a symbolic and institutional sense that something about the democratic transition was incomplete. The fact that Poland embarked upon late lustration and file access programmes could, therefore, be seen as an expression of this perceived need to deepen the democratisation process by expanding the scope of transparency measures. Calls for broadening the scope of lustration thus often came to be regarded as a key element of far-reaching moral and political renewal that many felt was required in post-communist Poland. Specifically, the notion that political 16 However, this ignores the fact that this 'awkwardness' was driven by the key tension at the heart of Poland's relationship with the EU which stems from the dissonance between Poland's size (both geographically and demographically) and its concomitant aspirations to be a major EU player -and, particularly, to play a regional leadership role -on the one hand, and its economic and (arguably linked) geo-political clout and capacity to deliver on this ambitious prospectus, on the other. 17 This tension is, I would argue, a fundamental one that did not go away following the election of the Civic Platform administration, has asserted itself on a number of occasions, and retains the capacity to do so. The Civic Platform-led government tried to finesse this tension by developing close relations with the large EU member states; in particular, by maintaining a close alliance with Germany. However, it is far from certain that this 'mainstreaming' strategy really was that successful. For example, given the largely symbolic and technical nature of the EU Council presidency job, Mr Tusk's appointment was, some critics argued, a greater success for him personally than for Poland as a country in terms of its efforts to influence and shape EU policy and priorities.
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Looking at the level of Polish public attitudes, it is also worth pausing for a moment to examine and un-pick why it is that Poles are so overwhelmingly pro-EU and supportive of actually quite modest and realistic (some would say pessimistic). The one thing that they did want and expect the EU to deliver on -and which it did (or at least some of its member states did) -was free movement of labour and access to Western labour markets; in other words, the opportunity to travel and work abroad. 20 This was notably manifested in mass Polish migration to the UK, one of the few EU states that did not introduce a transition period which the EU accession treaties allowed (of up to seven years) and gave relatively un-restricted access to its national labour market to workers from the post-communist states of central and
Eastern Europe who, like Poland, joined the EU in 2004.
However, looking into the longer-term, there are problems with the fact that these two factors were the main drivers of high levels of public support for Polish EU membership. Firstly, in terms of public perceptions of the concrete benefits that EU membership brings to Poland, this meant that Polish Europhilia was highly contingent and could possibly come under strain as these benefits start to wear thin. This is particularly likely to be the case if the older EU member states ever cease to deliver Polish access to Western labour markets. In fact, in recent years West European governments have come under increased pressure to curb unrestricted access of East Europeans and others to their labour markets and welfare systems.
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For sure, since Poland's accession to the EU, Poles also started to perceive other concrete benefits from EU membership, notably: access to EU regional funding, of which Poland is now the largest net recipient. However, this is also highly contingent and the 2014-20 EU budget round is probably the last one in which Poland will benefit so substantially. Perhaps even more importantly, the main apparent benefit of, or 'success' associated with, EU membership -the opportunity to be able to travel and work abroad, and thus secure access to West European labour markets -and concomitant mass emigration that is associated with it, is, arguably, perceived increasingly as a sign of weakness and 'failure' within Poland itself.
In other words, the main concrete benefit from European integration is less obvious, particularly to the younger post-accession generation of Poles, and could become even less so in the future. Many of the post-enlargement generation either increasingly take this benefit of EU membership for granted or are frustrated by what they see as an invidious choice between: moving to take jobs abroad that fall well short of their abilities and aspirations on the one hand, or remaining in a country which they feel offers them few prospects for the future on the other. This is obviously the case among the more socially and culturally conservative elements of Polish society; especially older, less well educated Poles who live in rural areas and make up the core of this ideological trend in Polish society. But it also resonates and ties in with broader trends and perceptions, particularly among the younger, post-enlargement generation.
Arguably, many of the latter increasingly see the EU as the embodiment of both a stifling bureaucracy and political and cultural oppression, rather than symbolising the civilisation progress and socio-economic modernisation and solidarity that Poles were promised at the 
The importance of the Catholic Church
The third thing that I would like to examine is the importance of the Catholic Church in contemporary Poland: both in terms of very high levels of religiosity among Poles (as measured by regular Church attendance) and the key role that the Church has played as an institution in contemporary Polish politics. This is a phenomenon that is critical to our understanding of the other two processes that I have discussed above, democratisation and the country's relationship with the EU, having played a key role in how they worked themselves out in Poland. At the same time, it also (arguably) highlights Poland's uniqueness, particularly in the context of an apparently increasingly secular Europe, and questions the extent to which the country can be seen as a 'model' for either normative emulation or from whom comparative analytical lessons can be drawn.
The Church played a pivotal mediating role in helping to broker the round Paul II termed the 'culture of life' posed by the increasing availability and acceptability of artificial contraception, in vitro fertilisation, abortion and euthanasia. These processes were felt to be endemic to Western societies and to pose a formidable threat to the future of European civilisation. In other words, the key to how Polish Catholic Church's attitude towards European integration will develop in the future depends on the extent to which the EU as an organisation is, on the one hand, felt to be contributing to and strengthening these negative (in the eyes of the Church, at least) processes through its institutions and policies, or whether, on the other hand, the European integration project and these other civilizational processes are perceived to be developing on separate tracks. If the former is felt to be the case, this is likely to lead to greater hostility towards and suspicion of the European integration process on the part of the Polish Catholic Church, if it is the latter then there is likely to be greater openness towards the European project.
It is an open question, of course, what role the Polish Catholic Church will play in the future and whether the country will buck the trend of secularism that has swept across much of the continent (and which many feared European integration would accelerate) and maintain high levels of religiosity, with the Church remaining a key political actor as a continuing feature of the EU which is driven by an ill-fit between the country's size and aspirations, on the one hand, and its economic and geo-political clout on the other. Such 'awkwardness' has asserted itself on a number of occasions and has the capacity to do so again. This paradox is also potentially evident when one looks at public attitudes towards the EU, with Polish Europhilia being highly contingent. The main benefits from European integration are now less obvious to a younger, post-accession generation (and likely to become even less so) and some of these benefits -such as the ability to access West European labour markets and concomitant mass emigration -are perceived increasingly as signs of weakness and failure rather than success.
The civilisational choice which posited the idea of Polish-nesss and European-ness as complementary identities is not as obvious as it once was and, again, arguably becoming increasingly less so. Finally, the Catholic Church and high (and apparently relatively enduring) levels of societal religiosity are something that is unique to Poland and made all of these processes work themselves out differently, playing a key role in the democratisation process and in debates on European integration; although whether this will continue to be a feature of 'Polish exceptionalism' in the future remains an open question. In other words, the role of the Catholic Church highlights the fact that there is also a uniqueness in the way that these processes have worked themselves out in Poland.
So the answer to the question 'Does Poland provide a model for democratic transition and European integration (in the analytical and normative sense)?' is, to quote a Polish
Archbishop when asked whether the Catholic Church supported Polish accession to the EU:
'Yes but, with an emphasis on the but'. 36 And it is the 'but' as much as the 'Yes' that makes the Polish case interesting and important to understand if we want to make sense of contemporary Europe. Ironically, it is precisely this uniqueness that means we can draw insights from and learn about other cases by looking at the Polish one. 
